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A stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the
stable roommates problem is bistable if it is also a stable matching when the
ordering of the input preference lists is reversed. For the stable marriages
problem, it is shown that the bistable matchings are a sublattice of the dis-
tributive lattice of stable matchings. In addition, the GaleShapley algorithm
is modified to find the man-optimal bistable matching and to determine the
irreducible bistable matchings. ] 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
The stable marriage problem and its generalization, the stable roommates
problem, are well-known matching problems with elegant structure and algorithms
[3]. In the marriage problem, each of n men and n women has a list of the n
members of the opposite sex in decreasing preference order. A stable matching is a
matching with n (man, woman) spousal pairs such that no man and woman prefer
each other over their spouses. In the roommates problem, each of n persons (n is
an even value) has a list with the other n&1 persons in decreasing preference order.
A stable matching is a matching with n2 pairs such that no two persons prefer each
other over their assigned roommates.
It is well known, by the GaleShapley algorithm [1], that the stable marriage
problem always has a stable matching. Similarly, Irving’s algorithm [4] will deter-
mine a stable matching for the roommates problem, if one exists. Either problem
may have an exponential number of stable matchings, but determining a precise
upper bound is an outstanding open problem [3, 6]. Both problems have polyno-
mial-time algorithms, but several variations exhibit intractability [5, 8, 11].
Reversing the ordering of each preference list for an instance of either problem
yields a new instance of the problem. If a matching is stable for both the original
problem and the instance with preference lists reversed, then that matching will be
denoted as being bistable. For the bistable marriages problem, the following results
are described: a linear programming characterization based on [12], a sublattice of
bistable matchings based on the lattice structures of [3], a modified GaleShapley
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FIG. 1. Preference lists for simple example of bistable marriages.
FIG. 2. Lattice of stable matchings for Fig. 1.
FIG. 3. Preference lists for second example of bistable marriages.
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algorithm for determining the man-optimal bistable matching (if any bistable
matchings exist), and a partial order that represents all bistable matchings. For the
bistable roommates problem, an instance of the roommates problem that has
bistable matchings is provided. In a separate technical report [13], the elegant
2-satisfiability structure of [3] for representing the relationship among the stable
roommates rotations is extended to a 3-satisfiability structure to allow testing for
FIG. 4. Lattice of matchings for Fig. 3.
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FIG. 5. Instance of bistable roommates.
the existence of a bistable matching. These results, however, do not resolve the time
complexity issue for bistable roommates. Before proceeding to the details for
bistable marriages, a few motivating examples are given.
Our first example (Fig. 1) of a stable marriages instance with bistable matchings
is from Gusfield and Irving’s monograph [3, p. 22, Fig. 1.9]. Throughout this
paper, men will be labeled 1, 2, ..., n and similarly for women. Figure 1 gives the
preferences, ordered from the most preferred member of the opposite sex to the
least preferred, for each of the eight individuals.
The lattice diagram in Fig. 2 shows the stable matchings for the instance in
Fig. 1. Each matching has a label w1w2w3w4 to indicate that man i is matched with
woman wi . In navigating downward in the structure, men get matched with less
preferred women and women are matched with more preferred men. The most
curious feature of this instance is that every matching is also a matching when the
order of each preference list is reversed.
The next example (Fig. 3) of a stable marriages instance has stable matchings
that are not bistable. This second example, which is used throughout the discussion,
exhibits the intriguing sublattice of bistable matchings (Fig. 4) as the elliptical
nodes.
The instance of the stable roommates problem in Fig. 5 exhibits matchings that
are stable in three ways: those that are stable by the usual definition, those that are
stable when the preference lists are reversed, and those that are stable both ways
(bistable). Throughout the paper, persons in a stable roommates instance will be
labeled 1, 2, ..., n.
2. REVIEW OF STABLE MARRIAGES
Although the elementary GaleShapley algorithm for stable marriages may be
described at an intuitive level using the courting notions of proposals and
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engagements, a few rigorous definitions are desirable before reviewing the algorithm
and lattice properties. The notion of preference is pervasive:
The ordered pair (i, j) refers to the pairing of man i and woman j. Where con-
fusion on gender may arise, the notation mi and wj will be used in place of i and j.
i>mk j indicates that the pair (mk , i) is strictly preferred to the pair (mk , j)
by man mk .
i >wk j indicates that the pair (i, wk) is strictly preferred to the pair (j, wk)
by woman wk .
Note that indifference is prohibited; given two different members of the opposite
sex, one is strictly preferred over the other. We will say that i is preferred to j if the
pair with i is either strictly preferred to the pair with j or i=j.
These preferences are typically represented in an algorithm by a list-based data
structure with one node per pair and a linked list for each person with nodes in
decreasing preference order. For convenience, each node includes the rankm of the
node for pair (m, w) from man m’s perspective and the rank rankw from woman w’s
perspective. The rank indicates the node’s position on the preference list such that
nodes with smaller ranks are preferred over nodes with larger ranks. The notion
that no man and woman prefer each other over their spouses is formalized as the
definition of blocking pair:
For a given matching with (i, j) and (k, l), (i, l) is a blocking pair if l>mi j and
i>wl k.
Stability is the absence of a blocking pair in a matching.
A stable pair is a pair that appears in some stable matching for an instance.
A fixed pair is a pair that appears in all stable matchings for an instance.
A stable matching for the stable marriages problem may be found by using the
extended GaleShapley algorithm that features preference list node deletion in the
list-based data structure [3, p. 16]. The main point of the deletion strategy is to
prevent rejection of proposals by the women.
assign each person to be free;
while some man m is free do
begin
w :=first woman on m’s list;
if some man p is engaged to w then
assign p to be free;
assign m and w to be engaged to each other;
for each successor m$ of m on w’s list do
delete the pair (m$,w)
end
The correctness of the algorithm is summarized by the following observations.
First, the intermediate set of engagements is always stable among the persons
included in that partial matching. Second, the deletion strategy guarantees that a
man’s proposal is always accepted by the woman, because the suitor is always
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preferable to the woman’s prior engagement (if any). Third, all persons are even-
tually matched because a woman will never give up entirely on becoming engaged
and as long as she is unengaged she will receive new proposals.
The matching that is obtained by the GaleShapley algorithm is the man-optimal
matching. Of all stable matchings, this one has the property that all men are paired
with the most preferred woman possible, while still assuring stability. The woman-
optimal matching is defined similarly and may be found by exchanging the roles of
men and women in the GaleShapley algorithm. Besides the notion of preference
for members of the opposite sex, we also have a notion of preference for matchings:
A person is said to prefer a matching M to a matching M$ if the person strictly
prefers their partner in M to their partner in M$.
The apparent trade-off in preferences for the two sexes is formalized in the follow-
ing theorem:
Theorem 1 [3, p. 18]. Let M and M$ be stable matchings, and suppose that m
and w are partners in M but not in M$. Then one of m and w prefers M to M$, and
the other prefers M$ to M.
A matching M dominates a matching M$ if each man is either (1) paired with the
same woman in M and M$ or (2) paired with a more preferred woman in M than
in M$. The man-optimal matching dominates all matchings and the woman-optimal
matching is dominated by all matchings. The dominance partial order is a dis-
tributive lattice, where M 7 M$ (meet) is defined as the matching that results from
having each man choose the more preferred partner from M and M$ and M 6 M$
(join) is the matching that results from having each man choose the least preferred
partner from M and M$. Given that M and M$ are stable, the meet and join of M
and M$ are also stable [3, p. 20]. A distributive lattice (M, ) has the following
properties:
(i) for two elements a, b of the lattice: a 7 ba, a 7 bb and there is no
element c with ca, cb and a 7 b<c;
(ii) for two elements a, b of the lattice: aa 6 b, ba 6 b and there is no
element c with ac, bc and c<a 6 b;
(iii) a6 (b 7 c)=(a 6 b)(a 6 c) and a 7 (b 6 c)=(a 7 b) 6 (a 7 c).
(iv) a is a predecessor of b if a<b and there is no element c such that
a<c<b. An irreducible element has no more than one predecessor. (Technically,
these are the join-irreducible elements. An element a is join-irreducible if a=b 6 c
implies that a=b or a=c. [2]) Every element of a distributive lattice is the join
of a set of irreducible elements.
If a stable matching M includes the pair (m, w), then M is known as a (m, w)-
matching. The meet of all (m, w)-matchings, M(m, w) for a pair (m, w), is said to
be irreducible. The set of all irreducible matchings for a stable marriage instance
forms the irreducible matching partial order and is based on the same relationship
as the dominance partial order. Figure 6 gives the irreducible matching partial
order for the second stable marriages example (Figs 3 and 4); the underlined entries
indicate the (m, w) pairs for which the matching is the dominant one.
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FIG. 6. Irreducible matching partial order for Fig. 4.
Any stable matching may be determined by (1) applying the extended Gale
Shapley algorithm to obtain the man-optimal matching and reduced preference lists
and then, (2) non-deterministically choosing a sequence of exposed rotations where
each rotation is eliminated before choosing the next exposed rotation, thus giving
a sequence of stable matchings and the respective reduced preference lists [3]. For
a stable matching M (determined by the first elements of the men’s reduced
preference lists), its reduced preference lists, and a man m, let (1) sM (m) denote the
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first woman w on m’s list such that w strictly prefers m to her partner in M, and
(2) nextM (m) denote the partner of woman sM (m) in M. A rotation \ (exposed) in
M is an ordered list of ordered manwoman pairs, (m0 , w0), (m1 , w1), ..., (mr&1 ,
wr&1) such that for each i, 0ir&1, mi+1 is nextM(mi), where i+1 is taken
modulo r. Thus, a rotation is cyclic and the sequence of pairs may be rotated
without changing the meaning of the rotation. Given \, M\ is the stable matching
(called the elimination of \ from M) in which each man not in a pair of \ stays
married to the same woman and each man mi in \ marries wi+1=sM (mi) (which
we will call introducing the pair (mi , wi+1)). The reduced preference lists for M\
are obtained from the reduced preference lists for M by removing all pairs that are
less preferred by each woman to the pair that is her marriage in M\. For the
second example of stable marriages, the following rotations apply:
\1=(2, 2), (5, 5) \6=(1, 2), (4, 6)
\2=(3, 3), (4, 4) \7=(3, 4), (6, 1)
\3=(1, 1), (4, 3) \8=(2, 5), (3, 1)
\4=(1, 3), (5, 2) \9=(1, 6), (3, 5)
\5=(4, 1), (6, 6)
A maximal chain of matchings that proceeds from the man-optimal matching to
the woman-optimal matching includes each rotation exactly once, as seen in the lat-
tice diagram (Fig. 7) augmented with rotations for the second stable marriages
example (Figs. 3 and 4). Note that in each maximal chain, each stable pair for the
instance appears in at least one of the matchings.
The rotation partial order is based on an elegant isomorphism with the
irreducible matching partial order. Each irreducible matching, except the man-
optimal matching, is replaced by the single rotation that is eliminated from the
single dominating predecessor of the irreducible matching in the lattice of all stable
matchings. The dominance relation among the rotations is isomorphic to the
dominance relation among the replaced irreducible matchings. The rotation partial
order for the second stable marriages example (Figs. 3 and 4) is given in Fig. 8. The
set of all stable marriages is based on the one-to-one relationship between the stable
marriages and the closed subsets of the rotation partial order [3, Theorem 2.2.1].
A closed subset is a subset of the partial order such that an element may be included
in the subset only if all predecessors of the element are also included. Given a closed
subset, the corresponding stable marriage is found by eliminating the rotations,
starting with the man-optimal matching, according to any topological ordering of
the elements in the closed subset.
Gusfield and Irving [3, p. 73] suggest a simple O(n3) time algorithm for con-
structing the irreducible matching partial order (and the closely related rotation
partial order) by n applications of a modified version of the extended GaleShapley
algorithm (O(n2) time) that finds all irreducible matchings for a particular man.
For that man, the GaleShapley algorithm first finds the man-optimal solution
(which is obviously irreducible). After finding an irreducible matching, the man’s
marriage is broken and the GaleShapley algorithm continues until another
irreducible matching is found or some man’s preference list is exhausted. The set of
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FIG. 7. Figure 4 augmented with rotations.
rotations for a stable marriage instance is found in time O(n3) by the minimal-dif-
ferences algorithm [3, p. 93] that descends a maximal chain to eliminate each rota-
tion. Since each stable pair is either (1) included in the man-optimal matching or
(2) included in exactly one rotation (but not both 1 and 2), there is exactly one
rotation that introduces a (m, w) pair (that is not in the man-optimal matching)
when the rotation is eliminated (i.e., mi in \ marries wi+1=sM (mi)). So, for an
irreducible matching in the irreducible matching partial order, the rotation that
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FIG. 8. Rotation partial order for Fig. 4.
replaces it in the rotation partial order is the rotation that introduces all pairs for
which the irreducible matching is the dominant matching for those pairs.
3. DEFINITION OF BISTABLE MARRIAGES
The notions of preference and blocking pair must be enhanced to define the
bistable marriages problem:
For a given matching with (i, j) and (k, l), (i, l) is a reverse blocking pair if j>mi
l and k>wl i.
Bistability is the absence of blocking pairs and reverse blocking pairs in a
matching.
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The stable marriages problem may be described in a linear programming
framework that may be extended for bistability. For the ordinary stable marriages
problem, a matching is stable if and only if its configuration x is an integer matrix
of dimension |M |_|W | satisfying the following set of constraints [12, cited in [9,
p. 70]]:
:
j
xmj=1 for all m in M, (1)
:
i
xiw=1 for all w in W, (2)
:
j>m w
xmj+ :
i>w m
x iw+xmw1 for all m in M and all w in W, (3)
and
xmw0 for all m in M and all w in W. (4)
For bistability, the following constraint is a counterpart to constraint (3):
:
w>m j
xmj+ :
m>w i
x iw+xmw1 for all m in M and all w in W, (5)
Vande Vate [12] (also, alternate proof by Rothblum [10]) establishes that
integrality is guaranteed at the extreme points for constraints (1)(4). By symmetry,
their results also hold for constraints (1)(3) and (5). Even more importantly, their
results imply that (1)(5), bistability, has integrality guaranteed at the extreme
points. Man-optimality may be pursued by using the cost function max
m w rankwxmw instead of the less-specific max m w xmw (which must take on the
value n, the number of men (or women), based on the constraints). This use of the
women’s ranks is based on the lattice property that matchings less preferable for the
women are more preferable for the men.
4. STRUCTURAL RESULTS FOR BISTABLE
MARRIAGESTHE BISTABLE SUBLATTICE
The sublattice of bistable matchings is now examined in detail, including techni-
ques for establishing whether any bistable matchings exist and, if so, representing
them compactly.
Theorem 2. The meet (i.e., taking the most preferred woman for each man) of
two bistable matchings, with respect to the lattice for the given preference lists, is
bistable.
Proof. Suppose that matchings M1 and M2 are bistable. By definition, M1 and
M2 are in the lattice for the given preference lists and in the lattice for the reversed
preference lists. We know that M1 7 M2 is in the lattice for the given preference
lists, but we must show that it is also in the lattice for the reversed preference lists.
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It is seen in the lattice for the reversed preference lists that the join of two bistable
matchings (taking the least preferred woman for each man in the reversed
preference lists) corresponds to the meet in the lattice for the given preference lists.
Corollary 1. By duality [2], the join of two bistable matchings is bistable.
Corollary 2. If each matching in a maximal chain is bistable, then all
matchings are bistable. (A maximal chain is easily found by the minimal-differences
algorithm [3, p. 93].)
A sublattice is a subset of a lattice that is closed under the meet and join opera-
tions of the lattice. Due to the closure properties of the bistable matchings, they
form a sublattice. This implies that a bistable sublattice has a man-optimal match-
ing and a woman-optimal matching. If these are the same, then there is one bistable
matching. Figure 9 shows the sublattice of bistable matchings for the second
example (Figs. 3 and 4) of stable marriages. Similar to the irreducible matchings in
the lattice of stable matchings, Fig. 10 is the irreducible bistable matching partial
order for Fig. 9.
Note that the rotations from the stable lattice are replaced by permutations when
descending the bistable sublattice. Each permutation is the composition of a
sequence of rotations from the stable lattice. Later, the nature of these compositions
will be examined. The permutations for the bistable sublattice of the second stable
marriages example are:
FIG. 9. Sublattice of bistable matchings for Fig. 4.
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FIG. 10. Irreducible bistable matching partial order for Fig. 9.
?1=\1
?2=\2 \3\5
?3=\4
?4=\6
?5=\7\8
In Fig. 11 these permutations augment the bistable sublattice. The bistable per-
mutation partial order, which is similar to the rotation partial order for the lattice
of stable matchings, is given in Fig. 12. The relevance of these diagrams is now
formalized:
Theorem 3. The bistable matchings are characterized by the non-empty closed
subsets of the irreducible bistable matching partial order. (See [3, Theorem 2.2.1].)
In particular, (1) each bistable matching M is associated with the set S of irreducible
bistable matchings that dominate M in the bistable sublattice, (2) the join of S is M,
and (3) M dominates M$ (with characterizing set S$ of irreducible bistable matchings)
in the bistable sublattice if and only if S$ contains S.
Proof. Irreducible elements are a feature of distributive lattices that carry over
to the stable lattice and the bistable lattice [2].
Theorem 4. The bistable matchings are characterized by the closed subsets of the
bistable permutation partial order. (See [3, Theorem 2.5.7].) In particular, (i) each
bistable matching M is associated with the set of permutations that includes the exact
set of rotations on the chain from the man-optimal stable matching to M in the stable
lattice, and (ii) if S and S$ are the unique sets of permutations corresponding to distinct
bistable matchings M and M$, then M dominates M$ if and only if S$ contains S.
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FIG. 11. Bistable sublattice (Fig. 9) augmented with permutations.
Proof. The meet of two matchings (ordinary stable case) corresponds to taking
the intersection of the respective closed subsets of the rotation partial order.
Likewise, the join of two matchings corresponds to taking the union of the respec-
tive closed subsets of the rotation partial order. Applying this observation to just
the bistable matchings will partition the set of rotations to give the permutations
for the bistable sublattice. Each irreducible bistable matching will have its own
FIG. 12. Bistable permutation partial order for Fig. 11.
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permutation which, besides the permutations for the irreducible bistable matchings
that dominate it, is necessary to characterize it.
5. ALGORITHMIC RESULTS FOR BISTABLE MARRIAGES
The existence of bistable matchings may be established by searching for the man-
optimal bistable matching. This is accomplished by extending the GaleShapley
algorithm to mark additional pairs that may not be in a bistable matching. Recall
that the GaleShapley algorithm has the men propose from the beginning of their
preference lists, while women will break an engagement to become engaged to a
more preferred man. Whenever a woman accepts an engagement, any less
preferable men are deleted from her list and she is simultaneously removed from the
less preferable mens’ lists so that useless proposals do not occur. Now consider the
pairs that a man finds more preferable than a node deleted from his list. These
nodes may not be in the man-optimal bistable matching. To see this, consider the
preference list diagram in Fig. 13. When advancing the woman to her new engage-
ment, the usual deletions are performed. Additional nodes, at the beginning of the
man’s list, may never be in a bistable matching since the woman will not be paired
FIG. 13. Preference list diagram for modified GaleShapley algorithm.
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with a man less preferable than her present engagement. Thus, these nodes, along
with the woman’s engagement are reverse blocking pairs.
Instead of immediately deleting these nodes, they are simply marked as ineligible
(of course, all nodes are eligible until marked otherwise) and the man must again
issue a proposal. If a proposal to a woman is based on an eligible node, it will be
accepted and the usual list deletion along with ineligibility marking occurs. If a
proposal to a woman is based on an ineligible node, it is processed as though it
were accepted, but then this node is deleted leaving a previously engaged woman
unengaged. This key point differs from the ordinary GaleShapley algorithm, which
always finds a matching.
Theorem 5. The GaleShapley algorithm extended with ineligibility marking
finds the man-optimal bistable solution, if it exists.
Proof. Bistability for an output matching is guaranteed by observing that the
original GaleShapley strategy guarantees ordinary stability and that the output
matching may not include a pair that was marked ineligible. To establish
dominance of the output matching over all other bistable matchings, assume that
some other bistable matching is output. For this to occur, some man is matched
with a less preferable woman than his partner in the man-optimal bistable match-
ing. This contradicts the fact that men only move down their lists to accommodate
stability or reverse stability.
The ineligibility marking strategy facilitates the determination of the irreducible
bistable matchings. The bistable irreducible matching partial order (and the per-
mutation partial order) may be found in O(n3) time by extending the ordinary
GaleShapley technique in the algorithm for the stable irreducible matching partial
order. Recall that the approach uses n applications of a procedure to find the
irreducible (m, w)-matchings for a particular man m. This procedure will first find
the man-optimal bistable matching (which is irreducible in the bistable sublattice).
To find the next irreducible matching, we break m’s marriage and continue with the
eligibility-marking algorithm until another irreducible matching is found or some
man’s preference list is exhausted.
6. SUMMARY
As previously observed for the stable versions of the two problems [3], elegant
results are more easily derived for the bistable marriages problem than for the
bistable roommates problem. The elegant sublattice property of the bistable
marriages problem allows extension of the GaleShapley algorithm and the mini-
mal-differences algorithm for determining the man-optimal bistable matching and
for testing if all stable matchings are bistable, respectively. The bistable roommates
problem is addressed in a separate technical report [13] by using the propositional
2-satisfiability clauses of [3] to represent the forward and reverse non-singular
rotation structures, and then extending with additional 3-satisfiability clauses to
capture the interplay between the two orientations. The tractability of bistable
roommates remains an open problem.
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